The Political Spectrum

Wednesday night, as I was live-blogging the SOTU, I quipped about Bush's comment that we are not imposing our values upon the Iraquis. Even Peggy Noonan, who had been very critical of the President's inaugural, had complimentary words today about Bush's more moderate tone.

In the foreign-policy section the president was markedly modest in tone. The difference between us and our enemies is that we know we have "no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else." Freedom is advancing, subjugated peoples are voting, democracies are being born, we are "witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty." America will work with "our friends" in the Mideast to "encourage a higher standard of freedom." The government of Saudi Arabia should become more democratic; the "great and proud nation of Egypt" is capable of showing the way to greater democracy in the region. We "expect" the Syrian government to stop supporting terrorists. We are "working with our European allies" to convince Iran not to develop nukes. We "stand with" the people of Iran. This was gentle but pointed, more specific and less messianic, than the recent inaugural--and therefore less open to misinterpretation. It was more finely calibrated, which is to say it was calibrated.

Indeed President Bush's inaugural was less "messianic" in tone than the inaugural, though not by much. It is clear that he is putting dictatorial states on notice, whether they be friend or foe, though as Noonan notes he is not quite yet ready to promise open military action.

That said, I want to get back to the line that we know we have "no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else." I asked rhetorically then if this was true, and I repeat that question now? Do we have any desire to impose our values on other Nations, and if we do, should we?

The first part of the question is the trickier one to answer. In the strictest sense, we are not. It does not appear that we are hoping to create a replica of America's constitutional, federalist republic in the Middle East. We have a respect fot the different cultural norms of the people of Iraq and have largely refrained from attempting to dictate how they should construct their government. There appears, also, to be a recognition that there will not be the American style "separation of Church and state" (not going there right now) in this region, but our hope is that there will at least be a healthy respect, at the very least, of the rights of those with minority viewpoints.

But in a larger sense we are imposing a value, and it is the value of representative government. We have made a decision that this style of governance is the only one that can truly provide greater guarantees of human freedom and security, and we have undertaken a mission to spread the roots of this type of governance throughout the world. It is at one time a minimilist approach, while also being a guargantuan undertaking.

The truth is we are attempting to impose our values upon other people, albeit a rather general value that is nothing more than the fundamental cornerstone of our own polity, that being the idea that people ought to govern themselves.

So, if we acknowledge that at we are on some level attempting to impose our values abroad, that leads to this question: should we? Again, the answer is yes and no.

The second tenet of conservatism, as written by Russell Kirk in the Conservative Mind suggests that conservatives shun a universalist approach to politics. (Go to the Conservative Philosopher for the rest of the list)

(2) Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of human existence, as opposed to the narrowing uniformity, egalitarianism, and utilitarian aims of most radical systems...This prejudice has been called "the conservatism of enjoyment."

In many ways, this echoes Edmund Burke's "little platoons," which celebrate localism and the importance of the smaller communities, and what in turn breeds the federalist ideology. It recognizes that no one group or society has a monopoly on "goodness" or "rightness." Each community has its own norms that have been established over time, and those norms reflect each society's unique historical devlopment. Thus it is unwise to blindly attempt to transfer one community's set of values onto that of another.

But does this tenet conflict with the first tenet?

(1) Belief in a transcendant order, or body of natural law, which rules society as well as conscience...True politics is the art of apprehending and applying the Justice which ought to prevail in a community of souls.

This, at a glance, acknowledges a universal set of norms, or at least the idea that there is an ultimate set of values under which we must be guided. So do these two tenets therefore collide?

It is the mistake that Leo Strauss made when he critiqued Burke to assert that that a respect for unique, local norms is a rejection of transcendental values. What Burke, and later Kirk, believed is that each local community expressed the transcendent nature of the universe in its own unique way. Similarly, James Q. Wilson notes that even though certain socities have widely divergent cultural practices, they all ultimately reflect a universal moral sense. Thus, there is a universal set of values, but no society has a monopoly on those values. The only way to truly come to understand the good is to enjoy different experiences and develop a sense for what is the ultimate good.

But we're probably getting a bit off track here. Ultimately, the issue is whether the United States ought to forcefully, or not so forcefully coerce other nations to adopt a democratic form of government. In other words, is democracy a recognizable moral value for which all nations should strive for. Francis Fukayama argues that we have reached a terminal point in our history, and that democratic government has achieved a victory as the agreed upon best form. That is not to say we have reached an actual end of history - he does not argue that at all - only that representative democracy has shown itself to be the form of government that best guarantees human freedom.

Critics of this theory have abounded. Some have misunderstood Fukayama's arguments, believing that he is arguing that democracy has conquered all, while others have made pointed philosophical criticisms. But again, one should not make the mistake of believing that Fukayama has asserted the final victory of democracy over all other forms of government. There remain plenty of governments that continue to stand athwart history in defiance of the democratic order. The question is, what should we do, if anything, to push them over the edge?

It seems undeniable to me that there is a universal human drive to control one's own destiny, and that part of that drive would include the desire to control the faith of one's own government. Even the terrorists who claim to be enemies of democracy are driven by a desire to form a government created in their idealized image. They have rebelled against their own states as much because these dictatorships do not grant to them the freedom to shape the state according to their beliefs. These terrorists hope to rid their region of any vestiges of tolerance for rule outside the shari'a law. Thus they seek the freedom to make others unfree. It is a paradox that confounds the mind.

It is this that causes many to pause and ask, well, what if the newly liberated people choose to elect a hard-line government that does not respect minority rights? Is that democracy? The answer is yes, but it is the type of democracy that is itself tyrannical. As one who has worked on a dissertation critiquing Jefferso-Rousseauian democracy, I have claimed that democracy is not a good in and of itself. But that is not to say that representative government is not the fairest and indeed best form of government. My problem with unfettered democracy of the sort that places too much stock in the momentary will of the general populace is that it is not a particularly good form of self government. Democracy of this sort is little more than mob rule.

Which leads us, inevitably, to this crashing dilemma. At bottom, we seem to have concluded that self-rule is the only way to govern. A society wherein the populace has no say in its governance is not free, and it would be odd to suggest that is in any way a satisfactory or even moral polity. Thus the human appetite for freedom would be a universal, not particular one. And yet it is unclear that we have the ability to simply force our beliefs on others. And even if all we are doing is helping people achieve their desire for self-governance, it will not be clear that the end result is a form of self-government sufficiently respectful of minority rights or the rule of law. What then? Can we merely sit on the sidelines cheering them on, perhaps kindly suggesting some things they ought and ought not do? Maybe that is the answer.

In the end, I find myself trapped in what is a - to me - unanswerable moral dilemma. In many respects we would seem to be denying the pull of human history if we do not push forward a democratic advance. I also reject the implicit notion that the conservative veneration of the particular should force us to stand on the sidelines and do nothing because, after all, not everyone can have democracy. Balderdash. Unless we are to believe that there is a segment of the world's population innately incapable of self-government, then I have to accept that the democratic drive is indeed universal in nature, and we as the world's superpower have a basic duty to assist others in garnering the freedom that we take for granted. But the recognition of the undeniable fallibility of human nature prevents me from becoming as an active cheerleader in this crusade as others. If we are to undertake this mission, we must do so with great humility and an acceptance of imperfection. We will never rid the world of evil, and it is a folly to believe that we ever will. Even having this be our goal just so we can raise our sights is to set us up for ultimate failure. We will never be free from fear; such a sentiment is just silly. We can diminish that fear and strive to create an atmosphere wherein the opportunities for great evil are reduced. But if our goal is the actual achievement of an "end of history," then we will be sorely disappointed when the goal is never attained.

So, after all that has been said, perhaps we can simply come to this conclusion. We can't impose our values because such an action is, as Ralph Wiggam would say, unpossible. Even the cruel tyrants of the Soviet empire at their zenith could not "impose" their values on the people of Eastern Europe. But we can nudge them along a bit.