Tuesday, September 13, 2005
Conservative Conservatism, being the third part of American Conservatism
Part one here. Part two here.
The battle between Burkeans and Straussians helps to underscore the fact that conservatism avails itself of no easy definition. What’s more, while Burke and Strauss represent two pivotal elements of conservative thought, they are by no means exhaustive of all that fall under the purview of conservatism.
In my first part I also alluded to the fact that Burkean conservatism was in some ways not conservative. Similarly, Strauss’ anti-historicism is antithetical to any frame of thought that can be termed conservative. But in Burke’s case, his un-conservatism, so to speak, relates to Burke’s own liberalism. Burke was, after all, a Whig. And though he railed against the French Revolution, he was no reactionary.
This goes to the fundamental point of this entire series of posts. Conservatism as a political ideology is not conservative, particularly in the American sense. That is to say, the term conservative implies a regressive frame of mind, a timidity of action that is certainly not necessarily part and parcel of conservative thought. Bill Buckley is famous for writing that conservatives stand athwart history yelling STOP! But this is a rhetorical flourish that masks the progressive aspect of conservatism. As mentioned in part one Burke maintains that change is an essential aspect of preservation. A society that refuses to change and adapt will surely self-destruct. Conservatives are merely more measured in their desire to change.
This Burkean attitude is even more relevant in regards to American conservatism. It is fitting that the essay that has inspired generations of conservatives was written in response to the French Revolution, for it is in assessing French conservatism that we can more fully appreciate the un-conservative aspect of American conservatism.
French conservatism is truly that – conservative. Oddly enough the French right was born in the aftermath of the French Revolution, and served as the vanguard of the opposition to said revolution. (Much of the following paragraph is essentially a summary of René Rémond’s writing on the history of the French right). The loyalists stood opposed to virtually all that the revolutionaries represented. But slowly the French right learned not only to embrace the ideals of the French Revolution, but indeed they became the most ardent defenders of its tradition. It was the Orléanists who first embraced liberal (think classical) ideas – and in fact they are the closest the French right comes to resembling the American right. In 1848 the Orléanists gave way to the Bonapartists – the adherents to Louis Napoleon. These are the populist right-wingers who most dramatically embraced the principles of 1789.
But the paramount figure of the French right is undoubtedly Charles de Gaulle. In some ways de Gaulle transcends ideological classification, and in fact he desired to be above parties. De Gaulle was repulsed by the Pétain government, and he hoped to strengthen the French state and restore the sense of grandeur or greatness. France had been tarnished by the Vichy regime, and he pushed for a constitution that emboldened the executive department and expanded upon the tradition of heavy governmental involvement in almost all aspects of French political and non-political life. He was steeped in the Bonapartist tradition, and he relied on populist devices such as the referenda as a means by which to solidify the French state.
As regards the state, it is a critical aspect of French right-wing thought (of French thought in general). This dates back to Rousseau, and provides a stark contrast the American political tradition. The state was the vehicle to greatness, and that implied an active government that intervened heavily in the economy. Thus the French right has promoted dirigist economic policies that lead to substantial governmental involvement in business affairs and economic “plans” that almost call to mind the early days of the Soviet Union.
Not only does the French right advance what many Americans would call socialistic economic policies; they are active promoters of secularism. Again, this dates back to the Enlightenment ideals of the French Revolution and the desire for a much stricter interpretation of the separation of church and state than most Americans would ever dream of. The reason the veil controversy broke out in France was due to the right’s desire that religion be removed forcefully from the public sphere. Religion there is privatized to an extent that even many American liberals would deem excessive.
There is hardly any liberal tradition in France – liberal in the sense that America is a liberal (classical) society. The Orléanists are the closest representatives of said tradition, but the party that most closely allied itself to liberal economic policy – the UDF of former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing – is now defunct. Jacques Chirac tried to play the part of economic liberal during his Premiership in the mid 1980’s, but the results were disastrous for his party. There is simply no comparable element in France – at least one of any significance – to that of the American libertarian tradition in economic affairs.
The French right is truly conservative, at least if we take conservative in its most narrow dictionary sense. It seeks to preserve traditions established in 1789. The state plays a role that would be alien to the thought of most American conservatives. The French right truly seek to conserve, whereas the American right embraces a much more liberal ideology.
Hopefully this will become much clearer in the following posts as we finally concentrate on what this series of posts is supposed to be all about – American conservatism.
The battle between Burkeans and Straussians helps to underscore the fact that conservatism avails itself of no easy definition. What’s more, while Burke and Strauss represent two pivotal elements of conservative thought, they are by no means exhaustive of all that fall under the purview of conservatism.
In my first part I also alluded to the fact that Burkean conservatism was in some ways not conservative. Similarly, Strauss’ anti-historicism is antithetical to any frame of thought that can be termed conservative. But in Burke’s case, his un-conservatism, so to speak, relates to Burke’s own liberalism. Burke was, after all, a Whig. And though he railed against the French Revolution, he was no reactionary.
This goes to the fundamental point of this entire series of posts. Conservatism as a political ideology is not conservative, particularly in the American sense. That is to say, the term conservative implies a regressive frame of mind, a timidity of action that is certainly not necessarily part and parcel of conservative thought. Bill Buckley is famous for writing that conservatives stand athwart history yelling STOP! But this is a rhetorical flourish that masks the progressive aspect of conservatism. As mentioned in part one Burke maintains that change is an essential aspect of preservation. A society that refuses to change and adapt will surely self-destruct. Conservatives are merely more measured in their desire to change.
This Burkean attitude is even more relevant in regards to American conservatism. It is fitting that the essay that has inspired generations of conservatives was written in response to the French Revolution, for it is in assessing French conservatism that we can more fully appreciate the un-conservative aspect of American conservatism.
French conservatism is truly that – conservative. Oddly enough the French right was born in the aftermath of the French Revolution, and served as the vanguard of the opposition to said revolution. (Much of the following paragraph is essentially a summary of René Rémond’s writing on the history of the French right). The loyalists stood opposed to virtually all that the revolutionaries represented. But slowly the French right learned not only to embrace the ideals of the French Revolution, but indeed they became the most ardent defenders of its tradition. It was the Orléanists who first embraced liberal (think classical) ideas – and in fact they are the closest the French right comes to resembling the American right. In 1848 the Orléanists gave way to the Bonapartists – the adherents to Louis Napoleon. These are the populist right-wingers who most dramatically embraced the principles of 1789.
But the paramount figure of the French right is undoubtedly Charles de Gaulle. In some ways de Gaulle transcends ideological classification, and in fact he desired to be above parties. De Gaulle was repulsed by the Pétain government, and he hoped to strengthen the French state and restore the sense of grandeur or greatness. France had been tarnished by the Vichy regime, and he pushed for a constitution that emboldened the executive department and expanded upon the tradition of heavy governmental involvement in almost all aspects of French political and non-political life. He was steeped in the Bonapartist tradition, and he relied on populist devices such as the referenda as a means by which to solidify the French state.
As regards the state, it is a critical aspect of French right-wing thought (of French thought in general). This dates back to Rousseau, and provides a stark contrast the American political tradition. The state was the vehicle to greatness, and that implied an active government that intervened heavily in the economy. Thus the French right has promoted dirigist economic policies that lead to substantial governmental involvement in business affairs and economic “plans” that almost call to mind the early days of the Soviet Union.
Not only does the French right advance what many Americans would call socialistic economic policies; they are active promoters of secularism. Again, this dates back to the Enlightenment ideals of the French Revolution and the desire for a much stricter interpretation of the separation of church and state than most Americans would ever dream of. The reason the veil controversy broke out in France was due to the right’s desire that religion be removed forcefully from the public sphere. Religion there is privatized to an extent that even many American liberals would deem excessive.
There is hardly any liberal tradition in France – liberal in the sense that America is a liberal (classical) society. The Orléanists are the closest representatives of said tradition, but the party that most closely allied itself to liberal economic policy – the UDF of former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing – is now defunct. Jacques Chirac tried to play the part of economic liberal during his Premiership in the mid 1980’s, but the results were disastrous for his party. There is simply no comparable element in France – at least one of any significance – to that of the American libertarian tradition in economic affairs.
The French right is truly conservative, at least if we take conservative in its most narrow dictionary sense. It seeks to preserve traditions established in 1789. The state plays a role that would be alien to the thought of most American conservatives. The French right truly seek to conserve, whereas the American right embraces a much more liberal ideology.
Hopefully this will become much clearer in the following posts as we finally concentrate on what this series of posts is supposed to be all about – American conservatism.
# posted by Paul Zummo : 11:16 PM
