Sunday, June 26, 2005
Talk about your waste of judicial resources...
Continuing my post from yesterday, the week's decision in Halbert v. Michigan amounts to an enormous waste of judicial brain-power. Michigan law established a divergent course of appellate review in criminal cases. If you went to trial, you had a right to one level of appellate review and a right to appointed counsel for that review. If you pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, you only had access to discretionary appeal, and you did not have a right to counsel to assist in getting discretionary review. (If review was granted, counsel would be appointed.)
The Court held that this was unconstitutional, by waving generally in the direction of the due process and equal protection clauses. (It could not wave in the direction of the Sixth Amendment, because prior precedent established that this would not do the trick.)
But the Court's opinion only briefly (and half-assedly, I'd say) attempts to address the consequences. Now Michigan prosecutors will include the right to counsel for seeking discretionary review among the rights that the criminal defendant must waive in order for the state to agree to a plea agreement. By inserting one line into their standard form, they will be able to act as if Halbert had never been decided. (Imagine the criminal defendant with enough presence and knowledge to say he would agree to waive all the other rights, but refuses to give up his right to appointed counsel for seeking discretionary review under Halbert. Find such a one and I'll give you a dollar.) Ultimately, this was just a waste of judicial resources.
The Court held that this was unconstitutional, by waving generally in the direction of the due process and equal protection clauses. (It could not wave in the direction of the Sixth Amendment, because prior precedent established that this would not do the trick.)
But the Court's opinion only briefly (and half-assedly, I'd say) attempts to address the consequences. Now Michigan prosecutors will include the right to counsel for seeking discretionary review among the rights that the criminal defendant must waive in order for the state to agree to a plea agreement. By inserting one line into their standard form, they will be able to act as if Halbert had never been decided. (Imagine the criminal defendant with enough presence and knowledge to say he would agree to waive all the other rights, but refuses to give up his right to appointed counsel for seeking discretionary review under Halbert. Find such a one and I'll give you a dollar.) Ultimately, this was just a waste of judicial resources.